Coordination strategy

A strategic guide for regulators, policy makers, and media strategists on the role of coordination in sustaining national media ecosystems.

The importance of coordination

Broadcasters around the world are grappling with the challenge of digital transformation. Many media providers have chosen to invest in their own dedicated apps. The logic is understandable: by owning the app experience, each broadcaster hopes to capture audience loyalty, build direct relationships with viewers, and secure valuable data to build their business.

This strategy conceals a deeper problem. While it may appear rational for each broadcaster to develop its own digital proposition, the collective consequence of these choices is fragmentation and audience frustration. Audiences that once tuned into television channels with ease are now navigating a fragmented landscape of apps and on-demand services. Viewers tire of managing multiple apps, passwords, and interfaces, and gravitate instead toward global aggregators such as online video subscription services, online video sharing platforms, or the default app environments embedded in smart televisions.

The paradox is clear. What seems rational in isolation becomes self-defeating when pursued by all. This is a classic case of failing to coordinate. By examining the predicament of media providers through this lens, we can see why individually rational strategies can lead to collectively inferior outcomes, and why coordination on a shared platform such as the Service List Registry may represent a more sustainable path forward.

What is the Broadcaster’s Dilemma?

The Broadcaster’s Dilemma is similar to the classic game theory problem of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

To illustrate the logic, imagine a simplified market with only two main national broadcasters, broadcaster A and broadcaster B. Each faces two strategic options:

• Coordinate by contributing to a shared platform, such as a joint app or an open discovery system like the Service List Registry.
• Separate by promoting their own app, aiming to capture direct access to viewers and gain audience loyalty.

The resource for which the broadcasters are competing is audience attention, which is finite, bounded by availability to view and ultimately hours in the day.

• If both coordinate, they can create a seamless user experience that keeps engagement high and makes it less likely that viewers will drift to global platforms.
• If one coordinates but the other separates, the separate app may enjoy a short-term advantage, as it captures more data and revenue while benefiting from the restraint of the other.
• If both separate and provide their own apps, the result is fragmentation, audience disengagement, and an open invitation to global competitors.

For each player, the dominant strategy is to develop separate apps. Promoting a separate app appears safer than risking exploitation. Yet when both do this, the collective outcome is the worst of all worlds.

Individually rational strategies can be collectively irrational. Each broadcaster fears being exploited if it coordinates while others develop separate apps. As a result, each chooses a separate strategy. The logic of mistrust traps them in a suboptimal equilibrium.

The broadcasters, in other words, fall into a failure to coordinate.

What is coordination failure?

Coordination failure happens when organisations make individually sensible choices, but because they do not align on a shared strategy, the outcome is collectively suboptimal.

In reality, most territories contain not two but four or five major broadcasters, supplemented by smaller or niche channels. Extending the model from two players to many only sharpens the dilemma.

With multiple broadcasters, the willingness of viewers to manage separate apps diminishes rapidly. One app may be acceptable. Two might still be manageable. Three, four, five, or more competing apps quickly become unworkable, particularly when each requires separate logins and interfaces.

Every additional app increases friction and frustration, accelerating disengagement. In such an environment, the collective cost of separation rises sharply. The more broadcasters that pursue apps, the greater the risk that audiences abandon them altogether in favour of the convenience of global aggregators.

Unlike the two-player case, where one might develop a separate app at the expense of the other, in a market with multiple separate apps the gains are dissipated. No national broadcaster secures a lasting advantage. Instead, the beneficiaries are external actors with no stake in the national media ecosystem.

The result is under-utilisation. The potential for a vibrant local ecosystem is squandered, and global entrants capture the value. There exists a collectively better outcome, but individual incentives prevent it from being realised.

What is the importance of network effects?

Network effects are central to media distribution strategies. A platform becomes more valuable as more participants join. A joint broadcaster platform, whether through the Service List Registry or another mechanism, benefits from positive network effects:

• More participants increase value: the more services present, the more useful it becomes for audiences.
• Reduced friction: audiences need only one environment for discovery, not multiple apps.
• Stronger resilience: coordinated platforms are harder for global competitors to displace.

By contrast, separate apps dissipate network effects and fragment the market, weakening everyone involved.

What are the strategic implications of coordination?

The strategic implications for broadcasters are significant. The instinct to pursue separate apps, while understandable, is ultimately self-defeating.

Each broadcaster values its independence, but independence secured through silos is illusory. The more each insists on controlling its own app, the more audiences defect to global players, and the less independence broadcasters retain in the long run.

The alternative is to embrace coordination not as altruism, but as enlightened self-interest.

A shared platform, whether through the Service List Registry or another form of open discovery system, preserves diversity of content while eliminating friction for audiences. Broadcasters remain distinctive in their brands and offerings, but coordinate in how audiences discover and access them.

What is the importance of governance?

Governance is necessary to make coordination work. Trust is fragile in prisoner’s dilemma scenarios, and the fear of being exploited is real. Mechanisms must be in place to guarantee fairness, such as:

• Industry agreements that formalise participation.
• Joint ventures that discourage separation.
• Regulatory frameworks that ensure neutrality.

With credible governance, broadcasters can unlock the benefits of cooperation and resist the gravitational pull of global competitors.

Conclusion

Broadcasters today face a problem that is less about technology than about strategy. By framing their situation in the language of the prisoner’s dilemma and coordination failure, it becomes evident why individually rational actions lead to collectively irrational outcomes.

The resource at stake is audience attention. When broadcasters fragment that attention through competing apps, they do not merely share the spoils differently. They diminish the total pool of value available to all. The real winners are global entrants, who thrive on local disunity.

The path forward lies not in clinging to the illusion of independence in separate apps, but in recognising the strength that comes from unity. By cooperating on shared infrastructure such as the Service List Registry, broadcasters can reduce friction for audiences, preserve national media ecosystems, and achieve outcomes that are better for each of them individually, and for all of them collectively.